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Abstract
I will argue that a representative group of films including Mr. Lucky (with Cary Grant), Rossellini’s Il Generale
della Rovere, and Galaxy Quest affirm an assumption that is as well known as it is offensively false to many: i.e.,
we acquire a virtue or quality of character by pretending that we already possess it—the ethic colloquially and
popularly known as “fake it until you make it.” The importance and power of this ethic, as thoroughly secular
as it seems to be, is best understood in the context of its Roman Catholic and ancient philosophical
provenance, which for the most part has been pushed aside by secular appropriations. The theme is not
exclusive to film but is especially suited to it, invested as it is in theatricality and performance per se. These
films (they are few among many), accordingly, are especially well positioned to confront the collateral anxiety
associated with virtue ethics inasmuch as hypocrisy seems an unavoidable condition of moral growth—these
films explore this problem by featuring protagonists who are confidence men or actors, who perform
virtuously without originally intending to be virtuous. At the same time, the films and innumerable other films
like them, profoundly challenge the other and dominant ethic of our time--“Be true to yourself ”--which is
itself a vestigial, secularized remnant of the hostile Protestant reaction to the Catholic tradition and which
takes particular exception to “fake it until you make it.” In this way, old theological and philosophical battles
have left their trace on modern popular culture even though their origins have been forgotten.
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An Unnamed Genre 
 
 
Consider the following films as belonging to a genre—a genre as yet unnamed: Mr. 
Lucky (1943), Il Generale Della Rovere (1959), and Galaxy Quest (1999). In the most 
general sense, one could say that they cluster together as film adaptations of what most 
people know as the Bildungsroman or novel of formation or development. It tells a story 
about growing up, an experience that is not exclusive to the young, who are its usual pre-
occupation, but, rather, an experience available to all ages—for, as these films remind us, 
one is never too old to grow up. But this general and familiar designation doesn’t capture 
what is truly noteworthy about these films (they are few among many) inasmuch as they 
propose that theatricality and imposture are the propulsive mechanisms of this growth. 
The principle is simply and colloquially stated: “Fake it until you make it”—a principle 
that, as I will argue shortly, is a vestigial, secularized remnant of a once potent and un-
questionably Christian, Catholic source, a principle that is still powerfully and habitually 
active in the cinematic imagination. Even so, active as it is, we need to do some work to 
recover the rationale of this rich line of thinking, and how it provides a foundation for the 
provocative reflection on and defense of hypocrisy that we find in these films.  
The assumption behind the imperative to “fake it until you make it”—as com-
monplace as it is strange and perplexing, and to many, even offensively false—is that we 
acquire a particular virtue or quality of character by first pretending that we already pos-
sess it; that is, through repeated practice, through the habitual performance of virtue, we 
actually become virtuous. A simple hint of what this notion could mean and of its wide 
circulation in popular culture, along with its faintly operative Catholic relevance, appears 
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in the first episode of the second season of West Wing (1999-2006); President Bartlet 
(Martin Sheen) tells White House Chief of Staff, Leo McGarry (John Spencer), that he, 
Leo, has too much faith in him, a faith he doesn’t share himself. Leo offers this bit of ad-
vice: “‘Act as if ye had faith, and it shall be given to you.’ Put another way, fake it until 
you make it.”1 It is helpful to know that McGarry is an Irish Catholic born in Chicago and 
raised in Boston.2 It is also well known that “fake it until you make it” is a therapeutic 
tool for building confidence in Alcoholics Anonymous. So it is for Amy Cuddy, of the 
Harvard Business School, who, in a well-known TED Talk, puts the commandment to 
work in her very successful self-help program. 3 She gives the same advice to people in 
any number of stressful situations ranging from business meetings to job interviews. Ar-
guing that one’s behavior can shape one’s mind, she claims, to take one of her examples, 
that “power posing”—standing in a posture of confidence, even when we don’t feel con-
fident—will lead us to actual self-confidence. Tweaking the commandment, she urges: 
“Don't fake it till you make it. Fake it till you become it.”4 
But there is a nagging and troubling implication: the reliability and plausibility of 
this claim about how we grow and change is oddly confirmed even as it is challenged by 
the example of fictional characters in a range of films who have no intention of becoming 
good people and yet somehow they do become so. At this point, it is important to be 
clear: I am not mistaking fictional characters for real people—rather, they are possible 
people who can be as engaging as real people and whose circumstances, however hypo-
thetical, are possibly even more compelling. The central figure in the kind of story I’m 
talking about here is the confidence man, who is inevitably a skillful actor—or, alterna-
tively, a protagonist who happens to be an actor, sometimes a professional actor, who, 
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accordingly, has an aptitude for fraud. This character either seeks to dupe strangers for 
some purpose, whether for money or self-esteem or reputation, or as a matter of profes-
sional practice, sometimes maliciously, sometimes not. To that end, he (it’s usually a he)5 
pretends to be someone he is not, who begins, in the process, to diverge from, even to 
contradict his original intentions and expectations—and, even beyond his control, to take 
on virtues, and a host of collateral loyalties, feelings, dispositions, and skills he didn’t 
happen to have beforehand. At a critical moment he is exposed as a fraud, but is given the 
opportunity to show that he is a changed man and to recover the trust of the people he has 
deceived.  That, generally speaking, this kind of character does change further suggests 
that no character, however distant from virtue, is beyond this kind of redemption. In these 
films, hypocrisy, in fact, outright imposture—so obviously adverse to virtuous practice, is, 
paradoxically, a cause of it, or at least, establishes the conditions that make it possible.  
Accordingly, the two senses of “hypocrite” are activated: we are reminded of its root 
sense in Attic Greek (hupokritēs), which means “actor on stage” and, as it first emerges 
in the Greek New Testament, of its later and lasting pejorative sense of “dissembler, pre-
tender, fraud.”  
These films are, thus, conversion narratives of an extraordinary kind insofar as 
they confront a paradox: that intentional imposture is not only not an impediment to ac-
quiring virtue, but a final demonstration that even the most hardened and recalcitrant 
character, even the sociopathic can be redeemed by means of his or her fraudulence. Put 
another way, these films explore, affirm, and relish the ironic conjunction of hypocrisy 
and virtue. The paradox is built into the very phrasing of “Fake it until you make it;” as a 
pointedly balanced rhetorical antithesis, it captures and announces this paradoxical con-
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nection, sealed and emphasized by the rhyme of “fake” and “make” that binds the two 
terms together conceptually; the apparent contradiction provokes us and demands resolu-
tion. This pattern is a good deal easier to demonstrate than to account for—a pattern that 
is certainly not confined to these particular films, or to film per se.6 Film, nevertheless, 
founded as it is in performance, calls attention to itself as performance in ways relevant to 
understanding the relationship between theatricality and moral development.  And alt-
hough I will discuss all the films I’ve mentioned here, I will spend perhaps a greater por-
tion of my time with Il Generale Della Rovere, which I think is a particularly fitting, even 
beautiful instance of this genre.  
Apart from clear family resemblance and the fact that some films listed here are, 
in my view, better than those that are not listed, there is a certain arbitrariness to my se-
lections, which is one kind of proof of just how pervasive works in this genre are: there 
are simply too many of them; one doesn’t need to search for them systematically; one 
runs into them accidentally. If the genre is yet to be named, I can make no claim to hav-
ing discovered it. It, whatever it is to be called, has been sufficiently well noticed by the 
on-line site, TV Tropes, whose geekish taxonomies of pop culture phenomena are legend-
ary. It identifies, catalogues, and categorizes the numerous variants and refinements of 
plot lines and subplots found within the general category of a recurring theme it calls 
“Becoming the Mask.” TV Tropes draws this name from George Orwell’s “Shooting an 
Elephant.”  In that essay, Orwell observes despairingly of his experience in Burma in 
which he finds himself pretending to be a colonialist autocrat and turning into one as a 
result. As he says of any man in his position, "[h]e wears a mask, and his face grows to fit 
it.” 7 The relevant story line in our case, and not Orwell’s, is that of the bad man pretend-
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ing to be a good man although Orwell shows that it clearly works in the opposite direc-
tion. Here is how TV Tropes describes it:  
The Mole or the Con Man takes on a fake identity in order to gain some-
thing: information, money, a safe place. As time progresses, he grows to 
love his new identity and the way people treat him. His new friends prove 
reliable and he is struck by the contrast. He might even fall in love with 
another person whom he is explicitly supposed to be taking advantage of. 
Either way, he wants to remain in his new identity forever.8  
 
The number of films—animated or not—begins to multiply. TV Tropes lists The Postman, 
Chicken Run, The Wedding Crashers, Ant’s Life, The Music Man, Dave, While You Were 
Sleeping, Tropic Thunder, From Russia With Love, Mother Night, Avatar, and How the 
Grinch Stole Christmas. Other films, not listed, apart from the many other films one 
could list, include: Dangerous Liaisons, Valmont, About a Boy, Somersby, Six Degrees of 
Separation, The Royal Tenenbaums, My Favorite Year, Antonioni’s The Passenger and 
Kurosawa’s Kagemusha.9 
Sources 
 
Before we can see how this paradox is addressed in these films, we need to look to the 
historical sources that call this paradox forth and give it some depth. TV Tropes usefully 
provides us with only the shadow of a well-worked out tradition of thinking. As I’ve al-
ready claimed, if “fake it until you make it” has any currency in the 21st century, it is be-
cause it has a deeply and habitually ingrained, if culturally forgotten Christian source—
more specifically a Catholic or an Anglo-Catholic one. The idea has, as one might expect, 
an ancient provenance. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, argues that one becomes 
virtuous or vicious through making corresponding sorts of actions habitual. The process 
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begins with doing: “the virtues …we acquire by first having put them into action, and the 
same is true of the arts. For the things which we have to learn before we can do them we 
learn by doing.” Just as “men become builders by building houses, and harpists by play-
ing the harp . . . we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercis-
ing self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage” and so on through all the 
virtues and vices. He adds: “To sum it all up, in a single account, a state of character re-
sults from the repetition of certain activities.”10  
At the same time, becoming virtuous will always involve the imitation of role 
models as a natural route to acquiring a virtue that one doesn’t have, and hence there is a 
natural caution about keeping young people out of range of unacceptable models.11 And 
so the argument runs, from Plato through to Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park, which as-
sumes, as Lionel Trilling observes, “that the impersonation of a bad or inferior character 
will have a harmful effect on the impersonator . . . .” 12 This is why Sir Thomas Bertram 
in Mansfield Park is so horrified when he learns that his children are engaging in amateur 
theatrics in his home. Bad habits are as easy to acquire as they are difficult to undo and 
actors are particularly susceptible to this.13  
Ultimately, this idea that virtue is acquired through repeatedly performing virtu-
ous acts was absorbed into Christianity especially by way of St. Thomas Aquinas and 
Erasmus, who did much to crystalize this tradition. C.S. Lewis, who never took the step 
from Anglo-Catholicism to Catholicism, aligns himself with that tradition as he simply 
and clearly lays out the connection between virtue and performance in Mere Christiani-
ty—although some might say more simply than clearly. In a chapter entitled “Let’s Pre-
tend,” 14 Lewis mentions the old story, which suggests a provenance embedded in the 
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wider culture—the obverse of the one which we have just heard in connection with Or-
well--“about someone who had to wear a mask; a mask which made him look much nicer 
than he really was. He had to wear it for years. And when he took it off he found his own 
face had grown to fit it. He was now really beautiful. What had begun as a disguise had 
become a reality.”15  He means to elicit and illustrate a principle relevant not only to 
Christianity but to education generally, which is perhaps as obvious as it is unfashionable. 
As Lewis puts it, “very often the only way to get a quality in reality is to start behaving as 
if you had it already.” This is why children’s games, he adds, are so important: “They are 
always pretending to be grown ups—playing soldiers, playing shop” and the like, so that 
“the pretense of being grown up helps them to grow up in earnest.” 16 In another chapter, 
Lewis clarifies this process when he discusses how we acquire the virtue of charity. He 
says:  
Do not waste time bothering whether you love your neighbour; act as if 
you did. As soon as we do this, we find out one of the great secrets. When 
you are behaving as if you love someone, you will presently come to love 
him . . . . If you do him a good turn, not to please God and obey the law of 
charity, but to show him what a fine forgiving chap you are, and put him 
in your debt, and then sit down and wait for his gratitude, you will proba-
bly be disappointed . . . . But whenever we do good to another self, just 
because it is a self, made like us, by God, and desire its own happiness as 
we desire ours, we will have learned to love it a little more or, at least, to 
dislike it less.17  
 
To the extent that we do make the passage from faking (from, that is, a semblance of vir-
tue) to sincerity is, again, finally a matter of grace—we need the help of God’s free offer 
of grace and our free acceptance of it to take that step towards loving another self a little 
more, or, at least, disliking it less.  
Thus, figuratively, we wear a mask, or we “put on” love like a garment as Paul 
commands in Colossians 3:5-8: “And above all these things put on charity, which is the 
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bond of perfectness” because you have “have taken off your old self with its practices 
and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its 
Creator.”18 Thus, we “put on Christ”—the ultimate role model—when we emulate him.  
The traditional insistence on “habit” merges with another sense of the term, in English 
and in Latin, in which habit, or habitus, is raiment, clothing, and dress—a guise; a habit, 
as costume, invites the development, at first through pretense, of new habits in keeping 
with putting on the appropriate external manifestations of it. 19  
 As Lewis suggests, it’s likely that we wear the mask or put on the garment or 
habit (in both senses) for the wrong reasons—at the outset, anyway. That is, we perform a 
virtuous action without yet being virtuous—we feel we ought to because we are told we 
ought to do so but don’t yet know why, or we seek the praise of others. We have to put on 
clothes we don’t ordinarily wear and which don’t fit. Nevertheless, our performances, as 
they become habitual, reshape us; they move us to alter our patterns of thinking and feel-
ing in keeping with the increasingly familiar role that we are playing. As we perform, we 
might gradually come to understand its true end and value and, furthermore, we gradually 
learn to desire practicing it for its own sake. We become gracious, although whether we 
are or not is not for us to judge. We choose, but it is a choice we only gradually grow into. 
Love, like any other virtue, is not in this sense a feeling but a habitual practice.  
Here, Lewis echoes the comfortable distance the Catholic tradition has maintained 
from the problem of distinguishing the counterfeiting of or faking the virtues from a sin-
cere embrace of them, and whether or not acting as if one were virtuous weren’t tanta-
mount to endorsing hypocrisy as a path to virtue. For Aristotle, a deceptive gap between 
the sincerely virtuous and a mere appearance of virtue was a normal part of the process of 
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habituation. Catholic tradition was prepared, with some difficulty and ingenuity, to con-
cede that acting the part of virtue is not always a vice so long as it was strictly seen as 
part of the necessary preparation for a sincere embrace of virtue, the work of which is at-
tended by a divine offer of grace.20 In this way, what begins as a disguise—even though it 
gives a false impression—becomes, or approaches, a reality. Lewis is careful to make 
clear that the practice of charity is never purified of performance this side of the grave: as 
Lewis says, we learn to love another self, or perhaps at best, to dislike it a little less. This 
is in keeping with Aquinas, who precisely distinguished between what counts as hypocri-
sy and what does not. For Aquinas, as Jennifer Herdt puts it,“[p]erforming characteristi-
cally virtuous actions that do not reflect one’s actual state of character is not hypocrisy 
unless these actions are performed for the sake of appearing virtuous. If they are per-
formed instead for the sake of becoming virtuous, they are innocent actions.”21 
The tension between hypocrisy and virtue that the Catholic tradition tries to min-
imize comes to life with Friedrich Nietzsche, discarding as he does the Thomistic distinc-
tion between a culpable hypocrisy and innocent dissimulation. Growing into virtue is 
somewhat less a matter of an original honest intention, but, rather, an intention which is 
the collateral residue of hypocritical habit: 
The hypocrite who always plays one and the same role finally ceases to be 
a hypocrite; . . . If someone obstinately and for a long time wants to ap-
pear something, it is in the end hard for him to be anything else. The pro-
fession of almost every man, even that of the artist, begins with hypocrisy, 
with an imitation from without, with a copying of what is most effective. 
He who is always wearing a mask of a friendly countenance must finally 
acquire a power over benevolent moods without which the impression of 
friendliness cannot be obtained--and finally these acquire power over him, 
and he is benevolent.”22  
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For Nietzsche, in his post-Christian habitude, there is neither the comfort of grace nor of 
a tactical retreat from hypocrisy as he brazenly enlists hypocrisy as a condition of virtue, 
accepting even as he endorses its paradoxical efficacy. 
 
Reactions and Refinements 
 
To concede, as Nietzsche does, that virtue can begin with hypocrisy is an irony that pre-
pares us for and keeps company with the thematic territory of our films. But before we 
can turn to the films, we need to take one more step. The legitimacy of the school of 
“fake it until you make it,” as a model and a mechanism for how we grow into virtue, has 
had to contend with, and is conditioned by a more systematic and comprehensive chal-
lenge than the inherent and potent dangers of misplaced imitation. That reactive chal-
lenge, which gives a final defining edge to this tradition, is found in the profound cultural 
impact of the Protestant argument against theatricality per se, especially among the Puri-
tans and other Reformed Churches in England and America since the 17th century.  With 
the success of that challenge we perhaps find the reason why “fake it until you make it,” 
even though it is still alive, can in some sense seem exotic, and in need of historical re-
covery.  
This hostility has been particularly intense in the Calvinist tradition because the 
competence granted in the Anglo-Catholic and Catholic tradition to individuals in redi-
recting their own lives away from sin through imitation, through putting on virtue was 
harshly judged as too optimistic an account of spiritual regeneration—even though the 
success of this aim strictly depended on the free offer and acceptance of grace. To a Cal-
10
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vinist, we are either flatly damned or flatly saved without regard to the works we perform. 
What capacity we have for virtue is the fruit of an undeserved and arbitrary gift of divine 
grace to the utterly depraved soul, a soul so damaged by the Fall that there can be no 
question of self-repair, no possibility of a soul that can play any role in securing grace, a 
soul which, in fact, does not even have the power to refuse grace. The actor in such a re-
gime can be nothing more than a trifling hypocrite and an object of intense scorn; actors 
can only cultivate appearances, can only pretend to be what they are not—trifling because 
what they pretend to be can have no bearing on who they are or will be. There can be on-
ly one worthy performance of self, the one in which we see the true, unitary, given, and 
unmalleable self in perfect alignment with outward appearances.23 
But a much stronger challenge not only to the tradition of virtue ethics but also 
Reformed Christianity itself is the later cultural triumph of the ethic of being true to one-
self—a line of thinking about the nature of the self and its consequences for education, 
which was decisively influenced by the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is a view that, 
indeed, grows out of the Protestant tradition. For Rousseau, of Geneva—the city of Cal-
vin—proves himself an heir of Calvinism in the precision with which he inverts a Calvin-
ist line of thinking: humankind, for him, is as naturally and as absolutely innocent and 
good as humankind is, for Calvin, utterly depraved. According to Rousseau, as Jennifer 
Herdt puts it, we are “made as evil as we were made sociable.”24 A socialized self means 
the loss of this original, authentic self and its substitution with a constructed, artificial 
persona who postures, who is essentially an actor and, so, can only make a false display 
of him or herself to others. The proper aim of education should be to protect the natural, 
authentic self from such corruption; habituation, or any habit forming behavior, accord-
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ingly, is nothing more than slavish obedience to rules and conformity with examples set 
by others, which means ultimately a loss of freedom and autonomy. As Rousseau says in 
Émile, “[t]he only habit the child should be allowed to acquire is to acquire none.”25 Ac-
tors, once again, have to take cover: “What then is the spirit that the actor receives from 
his estate? A mixture of abjectness, duplicity, ridiculous conceit, and disgraceful abase-
ment which renders him fit for all sorts of roles except for the most noble of all, that of 
man, which he abandons.”26 
 
Film and Efficacious Faking: a Preamble  
 
These three films not only explore the causal link between habitual hypocrisy and the de-
velopment of moral character; one can’t help feeling a certain defensive intensity, as if 
each film were taking aim at the cultural disposition I’ve just described that devalues the 
role that pretense and habituation play in moral growth. In the process, the anti-theatrical 
tradition gets its face rubbed in what amounts to a naked defense of hypocrisy, and cine-
ma proves to be the appropriate medium to return fire. This is not to say that the target is 
so sharply defined or that these films are intentional commentaries on the relevant intel-
lectual and theological battles that have ensued over the centuries. They do, on the one 
hand, resist the extreme pessimism of the Calvinist tradition that essentially dictates that 
people can’t change just as they resist the extreme optimism of the Rousseauistic tradi-
tion that insists that people themselves don't need to change. That old argument is, of 
course, too distant from these films, but the films demonstrate that the habits of thinking 
and feeling that this debate engendered are still alive and active in Western culture. One 
12
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can still detect an optimistically polemical tone to these films—again, the suggestion that 
no character, however hardened and distant from virtue, is irredeemable.  
The films are, in any case, as I mentioned before, energized by the ironic implica-
tions of action that conjoins habitual hypocrisy and virtue—through, that is, proposing an 
action in which the hardened confidence man or actor/fraud are protagonists, whose tal-
ent for virtuous mimicry is utterly divorced from the end of attaining virtue; yet in the 
course of the films these intentions unravel as these protagonists, while they succeed in 
deceiving others, are gradually awakened to and converted through a process of habitua-
tion to genuine virtue. Self-serving, unashamed, and apparently unregenerate hypocrisy 
itself is a preparation for virtue, to the point where habit seems to trump vicious intention. 
We are once again reminded of Nietzsche’s tolerance of hypocrisy: “If someone obsti-
nately and for a long time wants to appear something, it is in the end hard for him to be 
anything else.”  
 
Mr. Lucky: “You don’t mind if I double-cross myself?” 
 
In H.C. Potter’s Mr. Lucky (1943), Joe “The Greek” Adams (Cary Grant), is a profes-
sional gambler and confidence man during the Second World War before Pearl Harbor. 
The story is a framed narrative, delivered as a flashback and told from the point of view 
of “Swede” (Charles Bickford), Joe’s friend and the master of Joe’s casino ship, the For-
tuna. In the opening movement of the film, after Swede’s introduction, we learn that 
Joe’s plans to open a new casino in Havana are thwarted when he discovers he has been 
drafted. However, already of uncertain name and identity (“Joe Adams” is likely not his 
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true name; as he says, “Who says it’s my own name?”), he assumes another identity, this 
time the name of a dying Greek-born sailor, Joe Bascopolous, a crew member of the For-
tuna, because he learns that Bascopolous has also been drafted and is classified 4F. He 
quickly gets down to business. Needing a substantial stake to get his casino venture going, 
Joe talks a women’s war relief agency into staging a fund-raising casino while planning 
to walk away with the proceeds. He pretends that he is a Greek patriot to convince Doro-
thy Bryant (Laraine Day), one of the leaders of the women’s group, that he is sincere in 
his desire to help out in their current efforts to send a relief ship to Greece, recently occu-
pied by the invading Germans and Italians. 
But the more attentively and habitually he acts the part, the more involved he gets 
with the charity, and the more he is distracted from his initial intention to swindle the 
women. The ladies begin the process of softening him by teaching him how to knit, and 
true to the pattern discerned by TV Tropes, he finds himself falling in love with the wom-
an he tries to swindle. As his confidence game unfolds, his imposture as a Greek patriot 
exposes and attunes him to the real depredations of the German-Italian invasion of 
Greece, to the point where he decides, in the end, that war relief is his true business.  
The slow process of Joe’s conversion, so to speak, is finally completed when he 
finds himself drawn even more deeply into his impersonation of Bascopolous with a far 
greater emotional investment and entanglement than he could ever have anticipated. The 
crucial sequence begins when he comes into possession of a letter, written in Greek, to 
Bascopolous. Concerned that the police are still after Bascopolous for past crimes (he is, 
previously unknown to Joe, a “three time loser”), Adams is hoping that the letter will 
give him information about Bascopolous that could throw the police off his trail. The 
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very evening of the charity ball, he takes the letter to a Greek Orthodox priest to translate. 
When he learns that the letter is from Bascopolous’s mother, Joe is no longer interested, 
and he says: “Thanks father, I just wanted to know who it was from.” But the priest bids 
him to listen as he reads it out loud—and Joe is arrested by it. In it, the mother gives an 
account of how Bascopolous’s brothers led their village in a battle against invading Ger-
man paratroopers until every last defender was killed. Already primed by his pretended 
and gradually habitual patriotism, Adams, now as the pretending son and brother, con-
nects with the mother’s grief and pride, and is moved by her abiding love for her way-
ward son as if he were that son; Adams takes on the son’s burden of shame and sorrow as 
the son might or should have carried it himself, in light of the brothers’ sacrifice, for lead-
ing the life of crime he shares with Bascopolous just as he is implicated in the suffering 
of his family—as if it were his own family, indeed, as if he had become, as the priest says, 
“the brother of all men.” 27 [https://youtu.be/C6KAMNSlEwg]  
In short, those emotional burdens and feelings of connection become his own. He 
then returns to the charity event resolved to turn over the cash raised at the casino to the 
charity, after he pays off “the boys,” unhesitatingly prepared, as he says, to “double-cross 
myself” [https:s//youtu.be/MiHWFMEKeOE]. So, he grows into charity, but only by per-
forming it first. The Church is, indeed, an agent in this process, and Joe may even have 
had a moment of grace, but the film shows no awareness of the religious tradition sup-
porting the actual efficacy of performing virtue. The priest’s primary agency is that of a 
translator and not that of a minister.  
The film also makes clear that if Joe is implicated in the sufferings of this family, 
he is implicated in the sufferings of his adopted country. It is no less appropriate for him 
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to call himself, or submit to being called “the Greek” than it is to be considered a son or a 
brother of all men: that sense of universal brotherhood begins with and grows out of local 
sympathetic connections. The film spends a bit of time puzzling over why this might be 
possible for Joe; we remember that before Swede begins to tell his story, he asks the har-
bor policeman on the scene if he has heard of “Joe the Greek”—a name Joe evidently 
doesn’t acquire until some time after the story that Swede tells ends and when it becomes 
public knowledge. The policeman has heard of him but wonders if Joe is really Greek; 
Swede answers that no one knows for sure, but the point the film makes is that, even if he 
isn’t Greek, he is nevertheless entitled to make the claim. There is a sense in which, be-
cause he pretends to be Greek beginning with his theft of Bascopolous’ identity, he be-
comes Greek.  In any case, no one questions the name. Once faked, like his charity, his 
Greekness is now, in every important sense, fundamental to his identity. He is, in a sense, 
more genuinely Greek, even though he was not born a Greek, than Bascopolous was. 
 
Galaxy Quest:  “We’re actors, not astronauts” 
 
Dean Parisot’s Galaxy Quest is a comically provocative exploration of the paradoxical 
relationship of hypocrisy and virtue. In the film, the lead actors from a long defunct Star 
Trek-style TV series are reduced to attending fan conventions signing autographs in cos-
tume. We notice how Jason Nesmith (Tim Allen), in particular, who plays Peter Quincy 
Taggart, the commander of the Protector, seems to be all too willing to relive his fiction-
al role at such occasions; he takes inordinate pleasure in indulging his fans who blur the 
real with fiction and persist in regarding him as the heroic commander. He answers ques-
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tions about his fictional adventures in the television series as if they were actual adven-
tures. That his sense of dignity hypocritically and self-deceptively depends on the bor-
rowed dignity of a fictional character is exposed when he goes into an angry funk after he 
overhears in the bathroom the mockery of a young man: “Nesmith? He actually gets off 
on all those retards. He has no idea he is a laughing stock.”28  
But then, real aliens, a delegation of Thermians, led by Mathesar, introduce them-
selves to Nesmith. They have come to Earth to recruit the man they believe is Command-
er Taggart to solve a real interplanetary crisis—reptilian humanoids led by Sarris (Robin 
Sachs) want to destroy the Thermians. The guileless Thermians, who have no concept of 
fiction and who lack any sense of theatricality, have mistaken episodes of the show for 
“historical documents” and have, accordingly, also misidentified the actors as real heroes. 
The Thermians, who are octopus-like in their natural form, have even assumed, with 
comic awkwardness, human form not only to communicate with their heroes, but also to 
emulate humans and to in some sense become human.29 The Thermians have also man-
aged to duplicate the starship Protector based on the “historical documents” and have 
made the phony technology of the series operational. Once the crew are aware that the 
Thermians are in real trouble, they balk, in spite of Nesmith’s enthusiasm—and for what 
seems to be an obvious reason: as Gwen DeMarco (Sigourney Weaver) who plays Lt. 
Tawny Madison, protests to her colleagues: “We’re actors, not astronauts!” Nesmith also 
has to answer to the skepticism of another cast member, Alexander Dane (Allan Rick-
man), who has no faith in Nesmith’s leadership ability; he is constantly critical of how 
acting the role of a commander goes to Nesmith’s head, reminding Nesmith that he is on-
ly “wearing a costume, not a uniform.”  
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The central crisis of the film arrives when the Thermians discover that Galaxy 
Quest is in fact only a fiction, as Sarris, having taken over the ship, forces Nesmith to 
confess to Mathesar that he is only an actor and, thus, a liar and a hypocrite 
[https://youtu.be/4MQo4LOG99g ].  The revelation, as Sarris maliciously hoped, crushes 
Mathesar’s spirit. But Nesmith, the cast, and fiction itself are redeemed. The very fact 
that Nesmith and the others are actors has prepared them to be the courageous, quick-
thinking heroes they only pretended to be as they rise to the occasion and ultimately turn 
the tables on Sarris. They can do so because they are able to draw on and adapt their re-
peated in-character experiences in fictive scripted scenarios and improvise in new and 
unexpected moments of danger; they are able to discover what they must do because of 
what they pretended they could do. 
There are representative moments in the film where Nesmith himself can’t think 
outside of his past scripted roles in particular episodes of the series as he awkwardly, 
slavishly, and uselessly reenacts, to take one example, the clichéd, choreographed body 
rolls he used as an evasive tactic in a particular episode (the so-called Episode 81). He 
mechanically deploys this tactic as a response to the anticipated attack of the vicious di-
minutive beryllium miners as if he were dodging laser fire; however, at the end of the 
film, in his final confrontation with Sarris, Nesmith performs the same maneuver sponta-
neously and perfectly in a precise adjustment to the circumstances; he gets the drop on 
Sarris, which enables him to vaporize him with a Thermian-created laser weapon; thus, in 
accordance with a now familiar pattern, ‘putting on’ the costume both literally and figura-
tively, becomes putting on the uniform, as the actor becomes the hero he once only por-
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trayed. He has the moves; now he has the right occasion to make use of them. Once again, 
the former—faking it—is a condition of the latter—making it.  
  
Il Generale Della Rovere: “I’ve taken you to heart.”  
 
The richest and most complex of this group of films is Roberto Rossellini’s Il Generale 
Della Rovere. The protagonist, Emmanuele Bardone (Vittorio de Sica), also known as 
“Colonel Grimaldi,” is a pimp, and like Joe the Greek, a gambler and a con man of uncer-
tain identity.  Bardone earns a living and tries to keep pace with his gambling debts by 
swindling relatives of the imprisoned or the missing during the German occupation of Ita-
ly; he persuades them that his motives are compassionate, professing more than once to 
his prospective victims: “I’ve taken you to heart.”30 He claims to have contacts in the SS. 
He is caught, but an observant SS officer, Colonel Mueller (Hannes Messemer), notices 
Bardone’s talent for acting the concerned and compassionate go-between. He accordingly 
recruits him, in exchange for his life and freedom, to impersonate Generale Della Rovere, 
a partisan leader, who has been inadvertently shot and killed when he resists arrest. Bar-
done is placed among political prisoners who know the general by reputation only and is 
ordered to spy on the prisoners, and, later, to identify another recently captured partisan 
leader known only as ‘Fabrizio’ whom Mueller is certain is now an inmate, but whom no 
one knows by sight. However, gradually, Bardone, behaving as if he were a genuine aris-
tocrat like Della Rovere, as well as a leader of men and a hero, becomes that leader and 
hero—he learns who Fabrizio is but rather than reveal him, he willingly faces the firing 
squad.31 
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The disparity between his hypocrisy and the actual practice of virtue is at first ex-
treme. We later get a full glimpse of Bardone’s disreputable career as a former cavalry 
officer; he was convicted of embezzlement, fraud, “swindling the disabled,” possession 
of drugs, drug dealing, and bigamy. But we can track how the film renders plausible the 
gradual transformation of Bardone into a truly compassionate and a courageous man. 
There are early signs that his pretended compassion for his victims might be finally dis-
tinguishable from a sincere, compassionate desire to help them. His one success in the 
film as a go-between comes thanks to the unexpected intervention of Colonel Mueller, 
who earlier, after a chance encounter, had taken a liking to Bardone. Mueller unexpected-
ly orders, as a favor, that a prisoner named Borghesio, for whose family Bardone is an 
agent, not be deported to Germany. With an unguarded and unmixed elation, arguably 
because of the good for which he has a small measure of responsibility, Bardone, as soon 
as he can get to a telephone in a café, enthusiastically gives the good news to the family. 
Yet, his charitable intentions, if distinguishable from his old habits, are by no 
means disentangled from them. Even as he delivers this good news, it appears that Bar-
done is attempting to maintain and refine his role—imperfectly—as an intermediary; for 
example, we find Bardone trying to imitate Mueller’s professional aloofness and conde-
scension that he displays towards him when he was pleading Borghesio’s case to Mueller. 
He subsequently turns it on Borghesio’s father. When Mueller orders that Borghesio not 
be deported, Bardone is profuse in his “blessings and thanks,” but Mueller rebuffs him: “I 
don’t like blessings or thanks.” Bardone parrots the same phrase to Borghesio’s father 
over the telephone in obvious response to a similar outburst: “I don’t like blessings or 
thanks.” His emergent sincerity blurs and coexists with his habitual hypocrisy as he 
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strings the family along with the hope that the prisoner might be released so that he can 
continue to squeeze them.32  We note that Mueller offers not even a hint that release is a 
possibility. And in the same café, moments later, Bardone returns to his normal routine as 
he meets with a woman searching for her husband whom Bardone assures her is still alive 
and about to be freed, but whom she already knows has been executed: he is caught in a 
lie; she has already informed on him to the police, who arrest him in the café. 
Colonel Mueller happens to be the officer in charge of the investigation and inter-
rogation, and he is now fully aware of Bardone’s record. And yet again, we see signs that 
Bardone’s motives are not so simply reducible to the disreputable; they are, in fact, deep-
ly ambiguous, as if Bardone were lost in the transition between faked compassion and 
sincere compassion, between the kind of man he evidently would like to be, and isn’t yet, 
and the man he currently is—between, that is, one kind of habit and an opposing, emer-
gent kind. When Mueller confronts Bardone with a large group of people whom he has 
cheated, Bardone steps forward aggressively and declares in his own defense, at the out-
set of an extraordinary monologue: “Maybe I was wrong—I was wrong, but for good rea-
son,” thus suggesting that his compassion for his victims and his desire to help them 
ought to weigh against the harm that he caused them, which he does faintly acknowledge 
[https://youtu.be/22qE70HzqVA]. 
 On the one hand, it is not at all clear that Bardone doesn’t sincerely believe that 
he was helping his victims; so impassioned and eloquent is his self-defense that his vic-
tims appear to assent to it (“Si, Colonel Grimaldi!”). What else was he to do (he asks rhe-
torically) but to give false hope where no hope existed of discovering the whereabouts of 
loved ones or of securing their safe return? When he learned of their final fates, what else 
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could he do other than to keep quiet to shield their families from the fact “that they slept 
ten to a cell, standing up like horses, that they were beaten and tortured, and packed into 
sealed trains headed for Mauthausen. . . . I kept quiet. I didn’t have the heart to tell them.” 
On the other hand, it’s not clear that this performance isn’t a perfect masquerade of com-
passion. There are many motives at work here that are hard to separate from each other; 
the masquerade could be a hypocritical diversion by which Bardone might mitigate the 
penalty at the hands of the SS given that he is at the mercy of his new friend, Mueller—
admittedly, an unlikely outcome. More likely, he might deflate the vengefulness of the 
people he deceives, and it appears he has succeeded in this since no one speaks against 
him or contradicts him in front of Mueller; or the masquerade is a narcissistic self-
justification by which he would at the very least deceive himself into thinking that this 
exhibition would morally, if not legally, exonerate him in spite of the facts of his case. In 
any case, without saying so, Mueller takes it as a masquerade.  And, fortunately for Bar-
done, his performance proves to be an audition that saves him from the firing squad, for 
Bardone evidently impresses Mueller that he is more than an ordinary scoundrel. One 
thing is clear—if Mueller believed that Bardone were capable of genuine sincerity, he 
would not have used him as a stand-in, as a changeling for Generale Della Rovere.  
The rest of the film proves that Mueller was mistaken in his expectations of Bar-
done and in his underestimation of the power of fakery. At first, Bardone takes to his new 
purely mercenary role as Della Rovere as he skillfully assumes the dignified and chival-
rous manner of an aristocratic soldier and partisan hero even as he harbors a certain con-
tempt for him: “Such men have everything given to them,” he confides to Mueller. “I am 
a self-made man.” And once again, in the literal and metaphorical sense that we are now 
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familiar with, he “puts on” the General like a garment—as we learn later that he actually 
wears Della Rovere’s clothes, which the Contessa, his wife, provides to the prison.  We 
discover that Bardone becomes what he pretends to be as he settles more deeply into his 
role and as he acquires a deeper sense of engagement and solidarity with his fellow pris-
oners; this deeper sense of community turns him, like Joe the Greek, into a true patriot. It 
is built on a sense of connection that is prepared for in the earlier scenes in which we wit-
ness his growing into compassion. In a remarkable scene, his performance of courageous 
leadership becomes the real thing for perhaps the first time. One night, there is an Allied 
air raid. He demands that the guard let him out of his cell into the courtyard so that he can 
speak to his terrified fellow prisoners still locked up in order that he might calm them. He 
steps into the role with some hesitation and he is clearly fearful for his own safety, before 
and after he speaks to the men, but when he does assume the role, it is no longer clear 
that he is merely acting [https://youtu.be/QpXas9TzB7M]. 
However, Bardone’s conversion is not yet assured.  Mueller makes one last at-
tempt to flush out “Fabrizio,” who is expected to make contact with Della Rovere. The 
opportunity comes when Mueller orders the execution of ten prisoners in reprisal for the 
assassination of a Fascist official by partisans. He knows that, whoever Fabrizio is, he 
will be among the new prisoners who are selected for execution and so he puts Bardone 
in the holding cell with them. All of the men expect that some or all of them will face a 
firing squad and Mueller expects that Fabrizio will expose himself to Bardone as a result. 
Clearly Bardone is still thinking of complying with Mueller’s wishes—Mueller has of-
fered him a large amount of cash and safe passage to Switzerland—as we see him scan-
ning the room and sidling up to likely candidates. Finally Fabrizio makes himself known, 
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but what he says perhaps moves Bardone to complete the passage from hypocrisy to vir-
tue because it is precisely the passage Fabrizio has made himself from faking it to making 
it: “Who would have thought we would have met here? … I would say I was a bank clerk, 
but I’m not much better. I was never a soldier, but I found myself in charge of thousands 
of men. I was able to bear such enormous responsibility because I believe I was fighting 
for a better world.”  
Inspired by the example of a fellow traveller, Bardone, after Mueller pulled him 
out of the line of men being led out for execution, refuses to reveal who Fabrizio is 
[https://youtu.be/B1DoefISNd4]. Realizing that Bardone is lost to him, Mueller helpless-
ly stands by as Bardone keeps his secret, and chooses death over betrayal, and resistance 
over servitude as confirmed in his final words to the men who are about to be shot: “Gen-
tlemen, in our final moments we remember our families, our country, and His Majesty 
the King. Long live Italy!” Bardone is by no means lost in his role as Della Rovere as we 
have come to suspect of some hard-core method actors; he is no more Della Rovere than 
Jason Nesmith is Peter Quincy Taggart, only the stakes in Il Generale Della Rovere are 
much higher. To the extent that he remains Della Rovere, Bardone stands in for him; 
Bardone continues Della Rovere’s inspirational work as a partisan, courageously sacrific-
ing his own life as Della Rovere did for the Italian cause. He comforts Della Rovere’s 
wife in an act of actual compassion (he writes in a final note to her, “My thoughts are 
with you”) that his habitually insincere performances of compassion prepared him for. In 
the end, Colonel Mueller implicitly recognizes this transformation of hypocrisy into vir-
tue by admitting to his failure to anticipate it. When his subordinate points out that one 
man, Bardone, was executed by mistake, Mueller insists that “the mistake was mine . . . . 
24
Journal of Religion & Film, Vol. 22 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 34
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/jrf/vol22/iss1/34
   
All mine”— the portentous repetition of “mine” drawing out the sense of his mistake as 
being his failure to anticipate Bardone’s unlikely moral growth.  
 
Conclusion: The Fictive and the Real 
 
Thus, all of these films are recognizable instances of a genre—still unnamed, with the 
added sense of “genre” not simply understood as a particular thematic pattern and a struc-
ture, and not just literary, and, finally, not only as a model of reality, but also as a way of 
thinking about and understanding human experience. These films are compelling primari-
ly because they advance and explore a particular understanding of how we change and 
grow, or how we could, even as they have built into them the strongest possible argument 
for why this change is implausible—inasmuch as the process begins with a bald-faced lie, 
with unashamed hypocrisy. It is an understanding of change which has profound Chris-
tian roots, and which has survived our cultural memory of those roots. At the very heart 
of that understanding is the implausible notion of change that above all relies upon a tra-
ditionally maligned source: the transformative power of fiction, which one justly fears 
will never escape a culture-wide and even atavistic suspicion of fraudulence. This theme, 
as I stated earlier, finds its natural home in cinema, the most potent form of fraud our cul-
ture has known. For film itself accepts that, as fiction, it is a kind of confidence game 
perpetrated by a conspiracy of professional and brazenly unapologetic fakers: directors, 
writers, actors, cinematographers, production designers, costumers, sets dressers, and so 
on, all dedicated to drawing us into the most vivid illusions of the real, in order to dis-
close to us how thoroughly the fictive is implicated in the real or, rather, how thoroughly 
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it ought to be—that, in the end, we do great damage to the prospects of our lives and of 
our culture by failing to understand that it is impossible to live well without seeing that 
what really counts as real is only so because one must first imagine it. 
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26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D’Alembert on the Theatre, introduction and 
translation by Allan Bloom (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1960), 80. At a tantalizing moment in Minima Moralia, 
Theodor Adorno reacts against this idea of the “authentic” self, of the “genuine individual” as a pernicious 
legacy of the Enlightenment, pernicious because it abstracts the self from social particularity. “Genuineness 
is nothing other than a defiant and obstinate insistence on the monadological form which social oppression 
imposes on man.” This drive to reduce individuals to ultimate and “original” units of being is, as a result, 
“a last bulwark of individualistic ethics [which] is a reflection of industrial mass production;” the individual 
as such becomes commodified, is fungible. In response Adorno defends the “inauthentic” impulse to imi-
tate as efficacious resistance—in effect, reversing Rousseau’s argument: “Anything that does not wish to 
whither should rather take on itself the stigma of the inauthentic. For it lives on the mimetic heritage. The 
human is indissolubly linked with imitation: a human being only becomes human at all by imitating human 
beings.” The mimetic impulses of the inauthentic experience are evident “in the first conscious experiences 
of childhood.” These impulses “always contain an element of imitation, play, wanting to be different.” See 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life (London: Verso, 1997), 153-4. 
 
27 Mr. Lucky, directed by H.C. Potter, performed by Cary Grant, Laraine Day, RKO, 1943. DVD. All sub-
sequent quotations are taken from this edition. 
 
28 Galaxy Quest, directed by Dean Parisot, performed by Tim Allen, Sigourney Weaver, Allan Rickman. 
DreamWorks, 1999. DVD. All subsequent quotations are taken from this edition. 
 
29 There is an inconsistency here given that this imitation is essentially a kind of hypocrisy, of pretending to 
certain qualities that the Thermians do not yet possess. At the same time, the Thermians regard the fictive 
thinking this would involve as nothing more than a form of lying. 
 
30Il Generale Della Rovere, DVD, directed by Roberto Rossellini, performed by Vittorio de Sica, Hannes 
Messemer, Sandra Miro (Criterion Films, 2005). All subsequent quotations are taken from this edition. 
 
31 The screenplay was written by Indro Montanelli, which was an adaptation of his novel, Il Generale Della  
Rovere  (Milano: Rizzoli, 1959). In turn, he based the novel and the short story it grew out of on his own 
encounter with one Giovanni Bertone, whom he met in prison during the Nazi occupation, who posed as 
Della Rovere. Tag Gallagher describes Montanelli’s version of the imposter as a “simple megalomaniac 
who persists in his role inspiring courage because the role incarnates what he actually wants to be” who 
simply “delighted in playing his role.” He contrasts this with Rossellini’s version: “a poor devil who takes 
so much courage from others that he wants to die for them,”who was “a deviant Neapolitan soul yearning 
to display itself.” See Tag Gallagher’s video essay “The Choice” in Il Generale Della Rovere, Criterion 
Films, 2005. 
 
32 Bardone has what Prince Myshkin in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot would call “double thoughts.” He refers to 
this in a scene in the novel that Gary Saul Morson calls attention to. In Morson’s summary the good-
hearted but disreputable Keller “comes to Myshkin to confess his evil deeds, and does so sincerely, as 
Myshkin appreciates. But Myshkin realizes that he also wants to borrow money, and anticipating the re-
quest, offers it to him. Admitting the ulterior motive, Keller admits that at first he prepared his confession, 
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"bathed in tears," and then "a hellish thought occurred to me: 'Why not, when all's said and done, borrow 
money of him after my confession?' So that I prepared my confession, so to say, as though it were a sort of 
'fricassee with tears for sauce,' to pave the way with those tears so that you might be softened and fork out 
one hundred and fifty roubles. Don't you think that was base?" Myshkin says to Keller: "But most likely 
that's not true; it's simply that both things came at once; that often happens. It's constantly so with me. I 
think it's not a good thing, though; and do you know, Keller, I reproach myself most of all for it. . . . I have 
sometimes fancied," Myshkin went on very earnestly, genuinely, and profoundly interested, "that all people 
are like that; so that I was even beginning to excuse myself because it is awfully difficult to struggle against 
these double thoughts; I've tried. God knows how they arise and come in the mind. But you call it simply 
baseness!" . . . (I 293-4) Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot, trans. Constance Garnett (New York, 1962).  See 
also Gary Saul Morson, “Misanthropology.” New Literary History 27,1 (1996), 65. Tag Gallagher notices, 
in the same spirit, a “double person”—“the more he robs his victims despicably, the more he tries to save 
them.” See “The Choice.” 
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